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Abstract 
We analyse the impact of government spending shocks on the real effective exchange rate 
and net exports in the Euro Area within a standard structural VAR framework. We employ a 
new database that contains quarterly fiscal variables for the Euro Area as a whole. We show 
that higher government spending leads to real exchange rate appreciation and to a fall in net 
exports, jointly with lower primary budgetary surpluses, which turns out to be fully consistent 
with the “twin deficits” hypothesis. The different components of public spending, namely 
wage and non-wage consumption expenditure, overall public consumption expenditure and 
public investment, bring about real appreciations. Our results are therefore also consistent 
both with the home-bias hypothesis of public expenditure and with public investment 
contributing to generating relative productivity gains in the traded goods sector.  
Contrary to what is observed in the Euro Area, the real effective exchange rate 
depreciates in the US in response to higher government spending. This discrepancy can 
ultimately be explained by the reaction of nominal interest rate spreads and the uncovered 
interest parity condition. The dissimilar reaction of short-term nominal interest rate spreads is 
attributed to two factors, namely the role of the US dollar as a "safe haven" currency and the 
countercyclical behaviour of discretionary government spending in the US. 
JEL Classification: E62; H30. 
Keywords: Euro Area; SVAR; fiscal shocks; effective exchange rates; relative prices; twin 
deficits; fiscal multipliers.  
 
 
 
 
Resumen 
En este trabajo se analiza el efecto de las variaciones de gasto público sobre el tipo de 
cambio efectivo real y sobre las exportaciones netas en el conjunto del área del euro con un 
VAR estructural estándar. Con este fin se utiliza una nueva base de datos fiscal trimestral 
para el área del euro. Nuestros resultados muestran que los aumentos de gasto público 
directo provocan una apreciación del tipo de cambio efectivo real y un deterioro del  
saldo por cuenta corriente, así como un empeoramiento del saldo primario de las 
Administraciones Públicas, resultado que está en consonancia con la hipótesis de «déficits 
gemelos». Los principales componentes del gasto público directo, (a saber, gastos de 
personal y consumo público en compras de bienes y servicios, el consumo público total y la 
inversión pública) generan apreciaciones reales. Así pues, nuestros resultados están también 
en consonancia con la hipótesis de existencia de un sesgo nacional en el gasto público y 
con la hipótesis de que la inversión pública da lugar a ganancias de productividad relativa en 
el sector de bienes comerciables.  
Contrariamente a lo que se observa en el área del euro, el tipo de cambio efectivo 
real en Estados Unidos se deprecia como respuesta a incrementos del gasto público. Tal 
discrepancia puede explicarse por la reacción del diferencial del tipo de interés con respecto 
al resto del mundo y la condición de la paridad no cubierta del tipo de interés. La diferente 
respuesta del diferencial de tipos de interés a corto plazo entre ambas áreas geográficas 
puede atribuirse a la conjunción de dos elementos de distinta naturaleza: el papel de 
moneda refugio del dólar y el comportamiento contracíclico del gasto público discrecional en  
Estados Unidos.  
Códigos JEL: E62; H30. 
Palabras clave: área del euro, VAR estructural, perturbaciones fiscales, tipos de cambio 
efectivos, precios relativos, déficits gemelos, multiplicadores fiscales. 
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1 Introduction 
The number of studies assessing the macroeconomic effects of fiscal shocks has increased in 
the last decade. While the most prominent papers have focused on the US (Edelberg et al, 
1999; Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2004; Mountford and Uhlig, 
2009, inter alia), growing evidence on other countries is available (Heppke-Falk et al., 2006, for 
Germany; De Castro, 2006, and De Castro and Hernández de Cos, 2008, for Spain; Giordano 
et al., 2007, for Italy; Marcellino, 2006, for the four largest countries of the Euro Area; Afonso 
and Sousa, 2009a, 2009b, for Germany, Italy and Portugal; Bénassy-Quéré and Cimadomo, 
2006, for Germany, the UK and the US; Burriel et al., 2010, for the whole Euro Area). 
However, most of these studies fail to analyse in depth the impact of fiscal shocks 
on external competitiveness. On the theoretic side, real appreciation following government 
spending shocks is a robust prediction in most RBC and new-Keynesian DSGE models. This 
notwithstanding, most of the empirical evidence concerning the US yields the opposite result: 
the REER depreciates in response to higher public expenditure (Ravn et al.; 2007; Kim and 
Roubini, 2008; Corsetti et al., 2009; Monacelli and Perotti, 2010; Enders et al., 2011). In fact, 
Ravn et al. (2007) and Monacelli and Perotti (2010) also obtain this result for Australia, the 
U.K. and Canada. By contrast, Beetsma et al. (2008) and Bénétrix and Lane (2009b) for 
panels of EU and Euro Area countries, respectively, argue that government spending shocks 
lead to real appreciations,1 in line with most theoretical predictions, and in sharp contrast to 
the US case. In turn, Froot and Rogoff (1991), De Gregorio et al. (1994) and Galstyan and 
Lane (2009b) observe long-run real appreciation in response to increases in government 
consumption. Notwithstanding the lack of agreement concerning the response of the real 
exchange rate, in all cases except Kim and Roubini (2008), fiscal expansions cause 
deterioration of trade balances.  
Hence, the purpose of our paper is twofold: first, we aim to assess the effects of 
government spending shocks on the REER and on net exports in the Euro Area as a whole, 
as there are very few studies that focus on this aggregate; second, we compare these effects 
with those observed in the US and provide a potential explanation for the discrepancies 
between the two geographical areas.  
As far as the Euro Area is concerned, we allow for the different underlying transmission 
channels of fiscal shocks to the REER and to net exports in order to frame our results within 
possible theoretical benchmarks. Despite the fact that the Euro Area only goes back to 1999, 
the synchronisation of monetary policies among core Euro Area countries dates from the 
beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, economic integration among most of them was considerably 
high even well before then. Hence, the aggregate analysis of fiscal policy shocks for the area as 
a whole is a pertinent endeavour. In this respect, the closest study to our paper is Beetsma et al. 
(2008), which analyses the effects of spending shocks on trade and budget balances in a panel 
of 14 EU countries. They find that government spending shocks lead to higher budget deficits, 
                                                                          
1. The same result is obtained by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), Bénétrix and Lane (2009a) or Galstyan and Lane 
(2009a) for Ireland and De Castro and Fernández (2011) for Spain. 
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real appreciations and fall in trade balances, so their results are in line with the "twin deficits" 
hypothesis. Meanwhile, Bénétrix and Lane (2009b) assess the effects of the composition of 
government spending on the behaviour of the real exchange rate in a panel consisting of the 
Euro Area countries. They observe that higher government consumption leads to real 
appreciation, whereas public investment increases cause a decline in the relative price of non-
tradables and may thereby lead to real depreciation.  
However, our paper differs from Beetsma et al. (2008) and Bénétrix and Lane 
(2009b) in some important respects. From a purely methodological perspective, we look at 
the Euro Area as a single entity, while the other two papers conduct panel analyses which 
ascertain average responses across the countries considered. In practice, a panel analysis 
implies that intra-EU trade linkages have not been netted out. Moreover, the real effective 
exchange rates of the countries considered in panel analyses are gauged, inter alia, with 
respect to the rest of the Euro Area or EU countries.  
Another important difference concerns the data. These two studies use annual data, 
whereas we employ quarterly figures. Annual data make some identifying assumptions more 
controversial, especially the assumption that fiscal variables do not react contemporaneously 
to other variables in the system. While it is true that most spending plans are already 
determined in the budget approved the previous year, amendments in the course of the fiscal 
year are frequent. Hence, our paper complements the analysis in Beetsma et al. (2008) and 
Bénétrix and Lane (2009b) in various important ways. 
As for the comparison with the US, we find dissimilar responses in the Euro Area 
and the US, in line with previous results in the literature. While the real effective exchange rate 
appreciates in response to government expenditure shocks in the EMU, the opposite 
happens in the US. In order explain these disparities, we analyse the reaction of the nominal 
effective exchange rate to spending shocks in both areas, the role of the uncovered interest 
parity condition and the cyclical behaviour of government spending shocks. Due to data 
availability for the Euro Area, we focus on the sample 1981-2007.  
We base our conclusions on impulse response functions drawn from structural 
VARs, wherein discretionary fiscal shocks have been identified following the methodology 
proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004). Our two main findings are that 
government expenditure increases bring about real effective exchange rate (REER henceforth) 
appreciations and higher budgetary primary and external deficits, in line with the "twin deficits" 
hypothesis. Likewise, the discrepancies observed in the reaction of the REER between the 
Euro Area and the US are related to the dissimilar reaction of short-term nominal interest rate 
spreads, which is ultimately attributed to the concurrence of three factors in the US: its 
leading role in the world business cycle, the role of "safe haven" currency of the US dollar and 
the countercyclical behaviour of government spending shocks. 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 explains how the real 
exchange rate reacts to public spending shocks in theoretical models, section 3 describes 
the data and section 4 the methodological issues. Section 5 gives the results for the Euro 
Area, while section 6 frames them in the theoretical literature. Section 7 compares these 
results with those obtained with US data. Finally, we present our conclusions in section 8. 
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2 The relationship between spending shocks, exchange rate movements and 
trade balances in theoretical models 
On the theoretical field, although there is not full unanimity about the sign of the response of 
the exchange rate to public spending shocks, in most of the models fiscal expansions lead to 
real appreciation. The traditional Mundell-Fleming model, an open economy version of the 
Hicksian IS-LM framework, predicts that higher government spending would spur economic 
activity and hence private consumption. The resulting higher final demand would then 
provoke an upward reaction of nominal and real interest rates that would trigger capital 
inflows and entail nominal and real appreciation. Higher final demand and currency 
appreciation would deteriorate the trade balance. 
Home bias is another usual argument behind spending shocks-led real 
appreciations in the literature. Insofar as government spending mostly concentrates on home-
produced goods, fiscal expansions should make these goods relatively scarcer, thereby 
increasing their relative price with respect to imported goods and leading to real appreciation 
(see Frenkel and Razin, 1996).  
Likewise, real appreciation is a robust theoretical prediction in most RBC and DSGE 
models. Under complete international markets for state-contingent assets, higher public 
expenditure results in a negative wealth effect that depresses private consumption. In this 
context, the usual consumption risk sharing condition implies that lower domestic private 
consumption calls for an appreciation of the real exchange rate.2 However, the assumption of 
complete markets is not crucial for real appreciation. Galí et al. (2007) show that the 
introduction of Rule-of-Thumb consumers may bring about positive private consumption 
responses to government shocks provided that the share of these consumers is sufficiently 
high. In this connection, Erceg et al. (2005) allow for Rule-of-Thumb consumers in one version 
of their open macroeconomic model and obtain the positive private consumption responses 
to government shocks, jointly with real appreciation. The latter takes place because 
irrespective of the share of Rule-of-Thumb consumers, consumption by forward-looking 
agents still declines due to the negative wealth effect. As only these agents have access to 
complete international financial markets, their consumption behaviour determines exchange 
rate movements via the aforementioned usual consumption risk sharing condition. 
 Conversely, a number of possible explanations for real depreciations caused by 
government expenditure shocks have also been put forward. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), 
under the assumption that the government follows a balanced budget rule, predict that in a 
large economy, a fiscal expansion increases the real interest rate, thereby depressing private 
consumption. Since the demand for money is assumed to depend on private consumption, 
insofar as prices are sticky, a fall in consumption leads to a depreciation of the nominal and 
real exchange rate. The problem with this hypothesis is however that in most pieces of 
empirical evidence private consumption rises following government spending shocks. Corsetti 
                                                                          
2. Monacelli and Perotti (2010) make an interesting comparison of the effects of government spending shocks on private 
consumption and the real effective exchange rate across different theoretical frameworks. 
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et al. (2009) contribute an interesting result. They argue that the economy's response to a 
spending rise depends highly on agent's expectations of spending reversals in the future. 
Thus, if current deficits are expected to be at least partly offset in the future long-term interest 
rates might even go down. In this context, private consumption would increase jointly with a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. In turn, Enders et al. (2011) justify real depreciations 
on the grounds of short-run international price movements tending to amplify instead of 
mitigate country-specific consumption risk. Finally, Ravn et al. (2007) introduce deep habits in 
consumption in an open economy model. In this framework, an increase in public expenditure 
provokes a countercyclical reaction of equilibrium mark-ups, a rise of wages and private 
consumption and a deterioration of the trade balance. Moreover, they argue that the decline 
of domestic mark-ups makes the domestic economy relatively inexpensive with respect to the 
foreign one, thereby causing real exchange rate depreciation. 
 As regards the effects on the trade balance, non-Ricardian models tend to display a 
positive correlation between net exports and the change in the budgetary primary surplus in 
response to higher public expenditure. In other words, with some qualifications depending on 
the size and the openness of the economy at hand, predictions of non-Ricardian models lean 
towards the "twin deficits" hypothesis. Thus, higher domestic demand and the real 
appreciation caused by an increase in government spending will stimulate imports, while 
exports may be negatively affected by the real appreciation. Thus, trade balances will fall 
jointly with governments' primary surpluses.  
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3 The data 
The baseline VAR includes quarterly data on public expenditure (gt), net taxes (tt) and GDP (yt), 
all in real terms,3 the GDP deflator (pt), the ten-year interest rate of government bonds (rt)4 and 
the CPI-based real effective exchange rate (REER) vis à vis the rest of the world. All variables 
are seasonally adjusted and enter in logs except the interest rate, which enters in levels.  
The definition of the fiscal variables follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti 
(2004). In particular, government spending (gt) is defined as the sum of government 
consumption and investment, while net taxes (tt) are defined as total government current 
receipts, less current transfers excluding interest payments on government debt.5 The REER 
is the relative price of the similar a consumption basket in two different economies and is 
defined as: 
t
tt
t P
PE
REER
*
                  (1) 
where Et is the nominal effective exchange rate defined in terms of Euros per units of foreign 
currency, Pt is the level of home prices and Pt* the foreign price level. According to this 
definition decreases in Et and REERt reflect a nominal and a real appreciation, respectively.  
We try other VAR specifications aiming to better understand the responses of 
certain variables to fiscal shocks. In particular, we assess the reactions of nominal effective 
exchange rates, net exports or the role of relative prices, including relative prices of non-
tradables with respect to tradables. For this purpose, we make the following usual 
decomposition of the REER: 
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Taking logs in (2) leads to the following expression: 
 tNTtTt reerreerreer ,,                    (3) 
where reerT,t denotes the real effective exchange rate of traded goods and reerNT,t the cross-
country ratio of the  relative price of traded with respect to non-traded goods (or relative price 
of non-traded goods). Following Burstein et al. (2005) and Monacelli and Perotti (2010), we 
compute the index of traded goods prices as the arithmetic average of the import and export 
price index:  txtmtT PPP ,,,,, 21   where pmt and pxt denote the import and export price 
                                                                          
3. In all cases the GDP deflator is employed so as to obtain the corresponding real values. 
4. The long-term interest rate is preferred to the short-term one because of its closer relationship with private 
consumption and investment decisions. However, this choice turned out to be immaterial to the results in that the 
inclusion of short-term rates in the VAR led to similar conclusions.   
5. More concretely, transfers include all expenditure items except public consumption, public investment and interest 
payments. 
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indexes (all in logs). In turn, tTP ,*  is obtained as the index of traded goods of the Euro Area 
trading partners, weighted by their bilateral trade share, which is taken from Eurostat (see 
table 1). Non-traded goods prices have been obtained as a residual.  
 
Table 1. Bilateral and total trade share 
  Euro area US 
Australia 0.8 0.6 
Canada 1.3 18.3 
Denmark 2.5 0.3 
Euro area  14.0 
Japan 5.2 12.7 
Korea 1.4 0.0 
New Zealand 0.2 0.2 
Norway 1.8 0.4 
Sweden 4.2 0.9 
Switzerland 6.3 0.9 
United Kingdom 18.5 3.6 
United States 15.7  
Total trade share 57.6 51.7 
 
 
On the other hand, as we are also interested in the analysis of exchange rate 
responses to different types of fiscal shocks we included non-wage government 
consumption, government spending on wages and salaries and public investment in turn as 
endogenous variables. As before, the GDP deflator was used to get their corresponding real 
values. 
For our analysis, we use the quarterly fiscal database for the Euro Area aggregate 
for the period 1980Q1-2007Q4 compiled by Paredes et al. (2009).6  The raw ingredients they 
use are closely linked to the ones used by national statistical agencies to provide their best 
estimates (intra-annual fiscal data, mostly on a cash basis) and preserve full coherence with 
official, annual data. Exchange rate data have been obtained from the IFS (IMF) database, and 
the imports and exports price deflators from the OECD. The rest of the data used in the paper 
are taken from ECB’s Area Wide Model Database (see Fagan et al., 2005). For the US, both 
fiscal and national accounts data have been taken from the NIPA accounts from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. 
                                                                          
6. This database is the same as that used in Burriel et al. (2010). Its main advantage is that it avoids the endogenous 
bias that arises if fiscal data interpolated on the basis of general macroeconomic indicators were used with 
macroeconomic variables to assess the impact of fiscal policies. While some authors might argue against using non-
official, estimated time series, the use of quarterly data facilitates the identification of fiscal shocks under the Blanchard-
Perotti approach, especially shocks to direct government spending. While it seems a sensible assumption that 
government spending decisions are predetermined within the quarter, it appears difficult to defend with annual data, 
thereby casting doubts on the estimated impulse responses in VARs. Hence, our preference for relying on quarterly 
data.  
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Despite the obvious drawback of using estimated instead of raw data for the Euro 
Area, quarterly data are preferred to annual ones because they avoid the need of making too 
stringent identifying assumptions. Rather, quarterly data allow for within-year feedback 
responses among all the variables in the system, especially between fiscal variables and GDP. 
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4 Specification and identification of the (S)VAR model 
The reduced-form VAR is specified in levels and can be written as  
ttt UXLDX  1)(       (4) 
where Xt ≡ (gt, tt, yt, pt, rt, reert) is the vector of endogenous variables and D(L) is an 
autoregressive lag-polynomial. The benchmark specification includes a constant, but no 
deterministic trends. The vector Ut ≡ ( reert
r
t
p
t
y
t
t
t
g
t uuuuuu , , , , , ) contains the reduced-
form residuals, which in general will present non-zero cross-correlations. The VAR includes 
two lags of each endogenous variable according to the information provided by LR tests, the 
Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria and the final prediction error.7     
We apply the identification strategy proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and 
Perotti (2004), which exploits decision lags in policy making and information about the 
elasticity of fiscal variables to economic activity.8 Their strategy relies on the assumption that 
the reduced-form residuals of the gt and tt equations, 
g
tu  and 
t
tu , can be thought of as 
linear combinations of three types of shocks: a) the automatic responses of spending and net 
taxes to the rest of macroeconomic variables in the system, b) systematic discretionary 
responses of fiscal policy to the same set of macro variables and c) random discretionary 
fiscal policy shocks, which are  the truly uncorrelated structural fiscal policy shocks the effects 
of which are the purpose of our analysis.  
The innovation model can be written as tt VU  , where Vt ≡ 
(
reer
t
r
t
p
t
y
t
t
t
g
t eeeee ,e , , , , ) is the vector containing the orthogonal structural shocks. 
Accordingly, the reduced-form residuals are linear combinations of the orthogonal structural 
shocks of the form tt VU  1 . The respective matrixes Γ and Β can be written as:  
 
                                                                          
7. In order to assess the robustness of our results to different specifications and transformations, we tried several 
alternatives, including estimating with variables in per capita terms, allowing for four lags instead of two, introducing a 
deterministic time trend and substituting the long-term interest rate by a short-term one. These different alternatives 
showed broadly the same qualitative results. In addition, we estimated our baseline VAR for the period previous to the 
monetary union. In this case, we also obtained broadly similar qualitative results, although impulse-response functions 
were estimated more imprecisely due to the lower degrees of freedom. 
8. Focusing on the euro area does not prevent from relying on this identification scheme. This identification method, 
usually applied to single countries, is also valid in our case because fiscal shocks at the euro area level are ultimately 
fiscal shocks originated in one or several Member States at the same time. It is equivalent to identifying fiscal shocks in 
highly decentralized countries. 
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As we are interested in analysing the effects of “structural” discretionary fiscal 
shocks 
g
te  and 
t
te  on the rest of the variables of the system, estimations for the αi,j’s and 
βi,j’s in (5) are needed. In general, approving and implementing new measures in response to 
specific economic circumstances typically take longer than three months. Hence, the use of 
quarterly data rules out contemporaneous discretionary responses of fiscal variables to 
changes in underlying macroeconomic conditions. Therefore, the coefficients αi,j’s in (5) only 
reflect the automatic responses of fiscal variables to the rest of the variables of the system, 
the first source of innovations aforementioned.  
The way fiscal variables are defined allows making further assumptions concerning 
the values of the αi,j’s. Specifically, the semi-elasticities of fiscal variables to interest rate 
innovations are set to zero given that interest payments on government debt are excluded 
from both definitions.9 Moreover, the automatic responses of public expenditure to economic 
activity and the real exchange rate are also set to zero.10 The case of the price elasticity is 
different because some share of purchases of goods and services is likely to respond to the 
price level. Thus, we set the price elasticity of government expenditure to -0.5.11  
In order to calculate the output and price elasticities we basically follow the OECD 
methodology proposed in Giorno et al. (1995). Output and price elasticities of net taxes, αt,y 
and αt,p, are obtained as weighted averages of the elasticities of the different net-tax 
components, including transfers, computed on the basis of information like statutory tax rates 
and estimations of the contemporaneous responses of the different tax-bases and, in the 
                                                                          
9. In many cases, the income tax base includes interest income as well as dividends, which in general co-vary negatively 
with interest rates. Nevertheless, the full set of effects of interest rate innovations on the different tax categories are very 
complex to analyse, especially in the euro area, and, on the other hand, their contemporaneous effects are deemed to 
be very small. 
10. The absence of contemporaneous response to real exchange rate innovations is justified on the grounds of the 
home bias of public expenditure items, especially public consumption. 
11. We took this assumption from Perotti (2004), which Burrriel et al. (2010) show that is immaterial for the EMU results.  
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case of transfers, the relevant macroeconomic aggregate to GDP and price changes. Tax 
base elasticities of the different tax and transfer categories have been taken from van den 
Noord (2000) and Bouthevillain et al. (2001), whereas output elasticities of the relevant tax 
bases were, however, obtained from econometric estimation with quarterly data. According 
to our estimations, the output elasticity in the Euro Area is 1.54, whereas the price elasticity 
amounts to 1.14.12  
Furthermore, given that our main interest lies on spending shocks we assume that 
expenditure decisions are prior to tax ones, which implies a zero value for βg,t. This allows us 
to retrieve 
g
te  directly and to use it to estimate βt,g by OLS, which completes the identification 
of the first two equations. Since we are interested in studying the effects of fiscal policy 
shocks, the ordering of the remaining variables is immaterial to the results. Therefore, the 
sequential ordering for the remaining shocks 
y
tu , 
p
tu , 
r
tu and 
reer
tu is imposed. The 
corresponding structural shocks are estimated by instrumental variables in turn, using 
g
te  
and 
t
te  as instruments for 
g
tu  and 
t
tu , respectively. In what follows we present our results in 
terms of impulse response functions. As usual, these are reported jointly with 68% confidence 
bands13 obtained by Monte Carlo integration methods with 1000 replications.   
One usual criticism to this methodology is whether VAR shocks are truly exogenous 
and unpredictable. While legislative and implementation lags make that changes in 
government spending and taxes can be anticipated, it is often claimed that VARs cannot 
properly account for such anticipation effects (see Leeper, et al., 2008). If agents are forward 
looking SVAR may fail to correctly estimate fiscal shocks, thereby leading to biased estimates 
of their effects. In this regard, Ramey (2011) provides evidence that SVAR-based innovations 
in the US as identified in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) can be anticipated and Granger caused 
by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) war episodes. However, Perotti (2004) finds little evidence that 
SVAR-based innovations are predictable. In turn, Bouakez et al. (2010) show that Ramey's 
results are most likely driven by the Korean War episode and thus the fiscal foresight problem 
is not severe enough to preclude the use of SVAR innovations as correct measures of 
unanticipated fiscal shocks.14 
                                                                          
12. In the case of the US output and price elasticities amount to 1.94 and to 1.15, respectively. See Burrriel et al. (2010) 
for further details.  
13. Edelberg et al. (1999), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Perotti (2004) among others, also 
choose this bandwidth to present their results. Nevertheless, choosing a lower significance level would keep the basic 
and most important results broadly unchanged, especially the appreciation of the real exchange rate, although such 
appreciation would only be significant during the first year.  
14. We performed Granger causality tests between our estimated government spending structural shocks and changes 
in the output gap with different lags. In no case was the null hypothesis that changes in the output gap do not G-cause 
spending shocks rejected.   
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5 The effects of government spending shocks  
5.1 The baseline VAR 
Figure 1 displays the responses of the endogenous variables to an increase of government 
expenditure by 1% of GDP in the EMU. The government spending shock takes 12 quarters to 
fade out. In turn, net taxes increase on impact although quickly, after four quarters, become 
non-significant. As expected, spending shocks bring about a deterioration of the general 
government primary balance, especially due to the higher persistence of the response of 
government spending. 
The increased public spending leads GDP to rise on impact and to display a 
significant positive response for 5 quarters. The impact output multiplier is gauged at 0.85, 
whereas the cumulative output multiplier15 after one year amounts to 0.98 and to 0.87 eight 
quarters after the shock (see table 2). These values are significant within a 68% confidence 
interval and are within range of most of the empirical evidence available.16  
Private consumption and private investment were included in turn in the VAR 
replacing GDP.17 In both cases, their impulse responses display a similar pattern to that of 
GDP. Private consumption increases on impact and remains significant for around four 
quarters, phasing out thereafter. Private investment rises on impact as well, in line with the 
accelerator hypothesis, although such increase is only marginally significant. This positive 
response fades away rather quickly. 
 
Table 2. Cumulative output multipliers in EMU 
  Quarters 
  1 4 8 12 16 20 
Baseline model 0.85* 0.98* 0.87* 0.60 0.27 -0.04 
Note: The asterisk indicates significance within one-standard deviation band-width. 
 
                                                                          
15. The cumulative multiplier at a given quarter is obtained as the ratio of the cumulative response of GDP and the 
cumulative response of government expenditure at that quarter. 
16. See Burriel et.al (2010). Specifically, focusing on Germany, Perotti (2004) gauges a short-term multiplier of around 
0.5, whereas Heppke-Falk et al. (2006) obtain an impact multiplier of 0.62. In turn, Baum and Koester (2011) get a 
cumulative output multiplier of 0.7 at the fourth quarter after the shock in their linear specification. De Castro (2006) and 
De Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) estimate multipliers around 1.3 after one year for Spain, while Giordano et al. 
(2007) obtain much higher values, around 1.2 and 2.4 on impact and after four quarters, respectively, for Italy, although 
in this latter case multipliers only apply to a shock to purchases of goods and services. 
17. To identify the fiscal shocks, we need to compute the elasticities of fiscal variables to private consumption and 
investment. They are gauged by multiplying the GDP elasticities by the inverse of the output elasticities of private 
consumption and investment, respectively.  
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Figure 1. Responses to an increase in government spending by 1% of GDP  
in the EMU: Baseline VAR 
 
Prices start rising one quarter after the shock and display a hump-shaped response. 
Accordingly to this pattern, government spending shocks entail persistent and significant 
inflation increases in the Euro Area for around two years. Likewise, the (nominal and real) 
long-term interest rate shows a hump-shaped rise in reaction to the shock.  
Government spending shocks lead to a fairly persistent real appreciation in the Euro 
Area. In our case, a 1% of GDP shock to direct government expenditure entails a real 
appreciation of 4.8% at the 4th quarter and of 4.4% two years after the shock. This result is 
fully consistent with Bénétrix and Lane (2009b), who use a panel with the Euro Area countries 
and with Beetsma et al. (2008) for a panel of EU countries. Moreover, our result is also in line 
with other pieces of evidence on some individual countries such as Bénétrix and Lane 
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(2009a)18 and Galstyan and Lane (2009a) for Ireland or De Castro and Fernández (2011) for 
Spain. However, such real appreciation to public spending shocks contrasts sharply with the 
results obtained in other studies for some other countries. Specifically, Kim and Roubini 
(2008) and Enders et al. (2011) for the U.S., Monacelli and Perotti (2010) for Australia, the 
U.S. and the U.K. and Ravn et al. (2007) for a pool of Australia, Canada, the U.S. and the 
U.K., find that higher government expenditure yields real depreciations.  
In order to deepen the understanding of real exchange rate responses, we replaced 
the REER in our VAR by its two main components, notably the nominal effective exchange 
rate and relative prices. In the case of the EMU as a whole, the increase in home prices can 
only be considered as an imperfect proxy for the rise in relative prices. Due to its considerable 
size, fiscal shocks in the Euro Area may imply non-negligible effects on international prices. 
Figure 2 presents the corresponding impulse responses. The observed real appreciation 
stems from both a nominal appreciation (e.g. appreciation of the nominal effective exchange 
rate, NEER) and an increase of relative prices, with the appreciation of the NEER being far 
more persistent. 
 
Figure 2. Responses to an increase in government spending in EMU:  
VAR with nominal effective exchange rates and relative prices 
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18. The appreciation they obtain for Ireland is much lower than our estimates for the euro area. They find a real 
appreciation of 0.9% on impact that increases in the subsequent three years, to reach a 2.6% appreciation in the 
third year. 
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5.2 Sectoral effects 
The baseline VAR was also re-specified by replacing the REER by both the real exchange 
rates of traded and non-traded goods as shown in equation (3). Figure 3 shows that the real 
exchange rate of traded goods and the relative price of non-traded goods appreciate after a 
shock to government spending.19 Although the appreciation appears more intense in the 
former case, it is only significant in the case of non-traded goods, which is consistent with the 
home-bias view on government spending. Insofar as it concentrates mostly on home-
produced goods, mainly non-tradables, fiscal expansions contribute to increasing their 
relative price with respect to traded goods and to imported goods. In this sense, the bottom 
graph of the Figure 3 shows that import prices fall relative to export prices. 
 
Figure 3. Responses of real exchange rates of traded and non-traded goods to a 
spending shock in EMU 
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5.3 Productivity, unit labour costs and mark-ups 
The responses of productivity, real wages and mark-ups are important to understand in depth 
the channels through which fiscal shocks affect the real effective exchange rate. An increase 
in government spending stimulates both nominal and real wages (see Figure 4) which is in line 
with other empirical studies for the US (see Perotti, 2007), as well as with the predictions by a 
number of new-Keynesian models (e.g. Galí et al., 2007). At the same time, labour 
                                                                          
19. Monacelli and Perotti (2010) find that both components, traded and non-traded, depreciate in response to an 
increase in public spending.  
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productivity shows a temporary upturn but to a lower extent than nominal wages and rapidly 
fades away, thereby raising unit labour costs of the economy.  
In turn, the rise of unit labour costs outweighs that of prices. Although there is not a 
direct measure of mark-ups, they can reasonably be approximated by the gap between 
prices and unit labour costs. Hence, on the basis of this assumption, government spending 
shocks entail a countercyclical reaction of mark-ups.  
 
Figure 4. Effects of government spending on costs, productivity and mark-ups in 
EMU 
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5.4 The effects of government spending on the external sector  
To assess the effect of spending on the external sector of the economy we estimate a 7-variable 
VAR model that includes net exports in addition to the 6 endogenous variables of the baseline 
specification. Moreover, we also try an alternative model with exports and imports of goods and 
services instead of net exports as such. Both specifications are formally equivalent, although the 
latter allows us to better understand the driving forces behind the reaction of net foreign 
demand. The corresponding impulse responses are presented in Figure 5. 
A 1% of GDP rise in government expenditure brings about a deterioration of net 
exports in the EMU of around 1% of GDP two quarters after the shock. Such fall in net 
exports is mainly explained by an upturn of imports of almost 5% in that quarter fuelled by 
higher final demand and the real appreciation, whereas despite the real appreciation exports 
remain barely affected in the short-term. Likewise, as the increase in public spending leads 
simultaneously to a deterioration of the trade balance and a reduction of primary budget 
surpluses, our results are consistent with the "twin deficits" hypothesis. This finding is in line 
with Beetsma et al. (2008) for the EU or Ravn et al. (2007) and Monacelli and Perotti (2010) 
for the US. 
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Figure 5. Effects of government spending on net exports in EMU 
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The current account balance (which is the sum of the trade balance, the income 
balance and the transfers balance) follows the same pattern as the trade balance, 
deteriorating after an expansionary shock. As Figure 5 shows, a 1% of GDP increase of 
government spending leads to a peak deterioration of the current account balance of some 
0.3% of GDP in the second quarter after the shock. The observed worsening of the external 
balance stems from the deterioration of the public saving, offset by the increase in private 
saving only in part, which turns out to be consistent with the rejection of the Ricardian 
hypothesis.       
5.5 The effects of different expenditure components  
Government consumption and government investment may be expected to have different 
effects on relative prices.20 To assess their effects, we replaced government expenditure by 
public consumption and public investment in turn in our baseline VAR. Figure 6 shows the 
responses of the REER to shocks to different government spending items. As expected, an 
increase in government consumption entails a real appreciation as a result of higher relative 
demand for non-tradables in the Euro Area; a shock of 1% of GDP leads to a real 
                                                                          
20. Ricci et al. (2008) and Lee et al. (2008) highlight the empirical role of government consumption as an important driver 
of medium-term real exchange rate movements for a large panel of countries. 
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appreciation of 1.4% on impact and reaches its peak at quarter 4 with a 4.2%. The real 
appreciation after two and three years remains sizeable, of 3.8% and 3.4%.21 While shocks to 
government's purchases of goods and services and to overall public consumption imply 
appreciations that turn out to be significant, expansions of government's personnel 
expenditure lead to non-significant, though still negative, responses of the REER. These 
results are broadly in line with the findings in Froot and Rogoff (1991), De Gregorio et al. 
(1994) and Galstyan and Lane (2009b).  
Public investment in the literature is deemed to have an ambiguous impact on the real 
exchange rate depending on how it affects the relative productivity of traded vs. non-traded 
goods. Thus, an increase in public investment that enhances productivity in the tradables sector 
may generate real appreciation through the Balassa-Samuelson mechanism, whereas if such 
productivity gains take place fundamentally in the non-tradables sector, it may actually lead to 
real depreciation caused by a decline in the relative price of non-tradables.  
The real exchange rate in the EMU also appreciates significantly when public 
investment rises. Accordingly, public investment shocks in the Euro Area do not seem to have 
entailed a relative increase of the productivity in the non-traded goods sector. Rather, it 
seems that public investment may have contributed to generating productivity gains in traded 
goods. This result is consistent with the observed decline of the price of traded goods relative 
to non-traded goods. However, it contrasts with the findings in Galstyan and Lane (2009b), 
who detect no significant long-term impact on the real exchange rate for the EMU countries. 
 
Figure 6. Responses of the real effective exchange rate to shocks to different 
government spending components in EMU 
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21. Galstyan and Lane (2009b) find that a shock of similar magnitude leads to a real appreciation of 2.14 in the euro 
area, well below the values reported here.  
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6 Framing the results in theoretical models 
US data usually show that public spending increases lead to positive private consumption 
responses and real exchange rate depreciation. While finding models able to reconcile both 
facts can be a challenging endeavour22 (as acknowledged by Monacelli and Perotti, 2010), 
our results so far can easily be accommodated to some theoretical frameworks. In principle, 
our results can fit well basic predictions by the conventional Mundell-Fleming model as well by 
some New Keynesian formulations.  
Firstly, the positive responses of output, private consumption, prices and nominal 
and real interest rates, jointly with the observed nominal and real appreciation are consistent 
with the traditional Mundell-Fleming setting. The increase in public spending would spur 
economic activity and hence private consumption. Likewise, the resulting higher final demand 
would provoke an upward reaction of nominal and real interest rates, thereby triggering 
capital inflows and nominal (and real) appreciation.  
Secondly, consistency with Balassa-Samuleson arguments is also found, as we 
observe both increases in relative home prices and in the relative price of non-traded with 
respect to traded goods. If government spending mostly concentrates on home-produced, 
mainly non-traded goods, fiscal expansions should make them relatively scarcer, thereby 
increasing their relative price with respect to imported goods and leading to real appreciation 
(Frenkel and Razin, 1996).  
Thirdly, higher private consumption, coupled with countercyclical mark-ups and real 
appreciation following an increase in public spending can be accommodated to theoretical 
predictions by a number of DSGE models wherein firms develop their activity in a 
monopolistic competition environment and in absence of complete markets. In particular, 
positive responses of private consumption, jointly with countercyclical mark-ups are in 
accordance with the predictions in Galí et al. (2007). Moreover, the open economy version of 
this model in Erceg et al. (2005) also fits the observed real appreciation caused by 
government spending shocks well. Despite the observed aggregate increase of private 
consumption, fully Ricardian agents would consume less due to the negative wealth effect. As 
only non-constrained consumers are assumed to have access to complete international 
financial markets, lower consumption by this group of consumers would call for a real 
appreciation for the equilibrium risk-sharing condition of consumption to hold. Our impulse-
responses are consistent with this channel.  
Finally, in these alternative theoretical frameworks public expenditure expansions 
entail higher domestic demand, real appreciation, a fall in the trade balance and a reduction of 
the budgetary primary surplus. The empirical evidence provided in this paper is also in 
accordance with these predictions. Consequently, as far as government expenditure shocks 
                                                                          
22. Ravn et al. (2007) find that the presence of deep habits is able to lead to a countercyclical reaction of equilibrium 
markups. Thus, an increase in government spending would entail a generalized decline of markups in domestic markets 
with respect to foreign markets, thereby making the domestic economy relatively inexpensive. Hence, the real exchange 
rate would depreciate. 
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are concerned, our results are consistent with the "twin deficits" hypothesis. In this regard, 
they are also in line with the evidence presented in Beetsma et al. (2008) for the EU and in 
Ravn et al. (2007) or Monacelli and Perotti (2010) for the US.  
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7 Comparing the Euro Area with the US: are they different?  
The most prominent empirical papers that analyse the effects of fiscal shocks on variables 
characterizing the external sector focus on the US (Ravn et al.; 2007; Kim and Roubini, 2008; 
Corsetti et al., 2009; Monacelli and Perotti, 2010) and show that government spending brings 
about exchange rate depreciation, in contrast with the evidence provided in the previous 
sections for the Euro Area. The question is why the real effective exchange rate behaves so 
differently in these two areas of a very similar size. In order to provide some explanation, we 
estimated similar SVAR models to those used for the Euro Area for the US.  
Figure 7 shows the responses of the main macroeconomic variables to a 
government spending shock. Despite some differences in terms of the shape of the 
responses and their timing, they are qualitatively similar to the Euro Area. Higher government 
spending brings about increases in GDP and private consumption in the first three quarters 
after the shock. Government expenditure also entails higher prices and interest rates, jointly 
with a deterioration of primary balances. 
When comparing the responses in Figure 1 and 7 we observe that the real effective 
exchange rate does react differently in the two areas. While government spending shocks 
lead to a real appreciation in the Euro Area, the REER in the United States depreciates on 
impact and in the medium term, with the response being non-significant between the 2nd and 
8th quarters after the shock. This finding is in line with Kim and Roubini (2008), Monacelli and 
Perotti (2010), Ravn et al. (2007) or Enders et al. (2011). In any case, it is surprising that the 
REER displays such a different behaviour between both areas.  
Theoretical models can be found to fit any of both sets of results separately. On the 
one hand, the responses of GDP, consumption, interest rates and the REER in the Euro Area 
seem to fit well the basic predictions of the conventional Mundell-Fleming as well of some 
New Keynesian formulations that incorporate rule-of-thumb consumers23 and some degree of 
price stickiness (Erceg et al., 2005). On the other hand, while positive private consumption 
responses appear difficult to reconcile with real depreciation in the US (Monacelli and Perotti, 
2010), Ravn et al. (2007) and Corsetti et al. (2009) propose promising alternative frameworks 
that are able to accommodate both stylised facts. In this paper though, the most challenging 
task is to explain why the real effective exchange rate behaves so differently in these two 
areas of a very similar size.  
It appears very unconvincing that the transmission channels differ significantly 
between both areas. Figure 8 shows that the REER depreciates in response to both public 
consumption and public investment shocks in the US, contrary to what happens in the Euro 
Area (Figure 6). Therefore, the different reaction of real exchange rates seems difficult to 
attribute to dissimilar effects of public investment on the productivity of non-traded relative to 
traded goods. Actually, the depreciation of the REER in the US to public consumption shocks 
resembles largely the observed one following shocks to total government spending.   
                                                                          
23. See Galí et al. (2007). 
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Figure 7. Responses to an increase in government spending in the US 
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The alternative decompositions of the REER offer interesting information. Figure 9 
reveals that the observed real depreciation stemming from higher expenditure in the US is 
entirely due to the depreciation of the NEER, whereas home relative prices rise (implying that 
the impact increase on local prices is more sizeable than on foreign prices).24 Hence, the 
depreciation of the NEER in the US more than offsets the appreciation that would take place 
via relative prices.  
The responses of the real exchange rate of traded and non-traded goods also differ 
between both areas. While non-traded goods appreciate in the US, traded goods show the 
opposite behaviour due to the depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate (Figure 9). 
Accordingly, the overall depreciation of the real exchange rate is explained by the depreciation 
of tradables outweighing the appreciation of non-tradables. This different reaction contrasts 
with the Euro Area, where both the real exchange rates traded goods and the relative price of 
non-traded goods appreciate in response to a shock to government spending.  
                                                                          
24. In none of both cases can the increase in home prices be taken as a good proxy for the increase in relative prices, 
given that both areas are fairly big and their shocks may have non-negligible effects on international prices.    
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Figure 8. Responses of the REER to different government spending 
components in the US 
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These results are consistent with the view that government spending mostly 
concentrates on home-produced goods, mainly non-tradables. Fiscal expansions contribute 
to making these goods relatively scarcer, thereby increasing their relative price with respect to 
imported goods which tends to appreciate the real exchange rate of non-tradables regardless 
of the area (Frenkel and Razin, 1996). The final effect on the real effective exchange rate is 
thus determined by the reaction of the nominal effective exchange rate.  
But the main question remains open: why nominal effective exchange rates react to 
spending shocks so differently in both geographical areas? Amid other factors such as 
changes in economic prospects or the evolution of risk premia, short-term shifts in nominal 
effective exchange rates are deemed to be determined by the spreads between home and 
foreign short-term nominal interest rates, i.e. the uncovered interest parity. Thus, in order to 
understand the reaction of the NEER to government spending shocks, it seems crucial to 
assess how such shocks affect interest rate spreads. 
 
Figure 9. Decomposition of the REER in the US 
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Figure 10. Effects of government spending on the short-term nominal interest rate 
spreads 
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As we aim to assess the effects on effective exchange rates vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world the relevant spreads should be gauged with respect to a "world" interest rate excluding 
the Euro Area or the US. Given that such variables do not exist we have calculated a proxy in 
each case. Thus, the relevant foreign short-term nominal interest rate for the Euro Area has 
been gauged as a weighted average of the short-term interest rates of the main OECD 
countries excluding the Euro Area.25 For the US, the relevant foreign short-term interest rate is 
obtained in a similar way, replacing the US short-term rate by the Euro Area one. As in the 
case of prices of traded goods, we use the weights of trading partners, taken from Eurostat in 
the case of the EMU and US Census Bureau for the USA. (see Table 1).  
In addition to the baseline variables, we include the relevant interest rate spreads in 
our VAR. Figure 10 seems to confirm our intuition. Short-term nominal interest rate spreads 
move in opposite directions to government spending shocks; higher government spending 
widens the spread in the case of the EMU, while narrows it in the US. Thus, according to the 
uncovered interest parity condition, the NEER should appreciate in the Euro Area and 
depreciate in the US, just exactly what VAR responses show.   
The dissimilar reaction of short-term nominal interest rate spreads is probably 
determined by the leading role of the US dollar as a "safe haven" currency in slowdowns. 
Figure 11 compares our estimated structural government spending shocks from the baseline 
VAR with the change in the output gap in both areas.26 Public spending in the US displays a 
broadly countercyclical behaviour; positive shocks tend to pervade with negative output gap 
changes. Given the leading role of the US in the world business cycle downturns would be 
accompanied by raising overall risk aversion. In this context, our results suggest that interest 
rate increases due to higher public spending in the US would call for even more elevated ones 
in the rest of the world.  
By contrast, as there has not been a single currency until 1999, no such "safe 
haven" role can be attributed to the EMU as a whole during most of the time span covered by 
                                                                          
25. These countries are Australia, Canada Denmark, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
UK. 
26. The change in the output gap as opposed to its level to assess the fiscal policy stance is currently preferred both in 
the European Commission and the IMF.  
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the dataset.27 Until that date, the NEER is derived form a basket of currencies with different 
risk perceptions. Hence, interest rate movements were not matched by shifts of similar 
magnitude abroad. On the other hand, as of the introduction of the euro in 1999, the Stability 
and Growth pact has compelled a number of Member States to adopt pro-cyclical fiscal 
policies in the context of the crisis in the early 2000s, as opposed to what it is observed in the 
US. As Member States failed to consolidate sufficiently in good times, the 3% of GDP deficit 
threshold was breached in many cases. Thus, countries had to adopt consolidation 
programmes to restore fiscal positions.  
Figure 11. Fiscal stance and short-term interest rate spreads 
 
 
                                                                          
27. Even after the adoption of the euro, such safe haven role cannot be advocated either as the current sovereign debt 
crisis shows.   
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8 Conclusions 
This paper assesses the effects of public spending shocks on the exchange rate and the 
trade balance in the Euro Area. We base our analysis on impulse responses derived from 
SVARs identified according to the methodology sketched in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). For 
this purpose, we employ a new database that contains quarterly fiscal variables for the Euro 
Area as a whole.  
Our analysis shows that government spending brings about positive output 
responses, with output multipliers somewhat below one. In turn, higher government spending 
leads to positive responses of private consumption, real exchange rate appreciation and a fall 
in net exports, coupled with lower primary surpluses. Hence, our results in this regard are fully 
consistent with the “twin deficits” hypothesis.  
Likewise, government spending shocks in the Euro Area bring about a rise in home 
relative prices and in the relative prices of non-traded with respect to traded goods. 
Moreover, we find that higher public spending entails upward responses of labour costs that 
outweigh the increase in prices, thereby leading to a countercyclical reaction of mark-ups, in 
line with a number of new-Keynesian theoretical models.  
The expansion in all the analysed components of public spending, namely wage and 
non-wage consumption expenditure, overall public consumption expenditure and public 
investment, bring about real appreciations. Our results are therefore also consistent both with 
the home-bias hypothesis of public expenditure and with public investment contributing to 
generating relative productivity gains in the traded goods sector. 
Finally, the comparison with the US reveals a different pattern of response of the 
REER to government spending shocks in both geographical areas. The real exchange rate 
appreciation in the EMU contrasts with the depreciation observed in the US. This difference is 
explained by the reaction of the nominal effective exchange rate in each case, as the relative 
price of non-traded goods behaves in a similar way.  
The reason for such opposite behaviour is found in the reaction of nominal interest 
rate spreads. When government spending increases such spread widens in the EMU while it 
narrows in the US. According to the uncovered interest parity condition, the NEER should 
appreciate in the Euro Area and depreciate in the US, just as VAR responses show. The 
dissimilar reaction of short-term nominal interest rate spreads is attributed to the leading role 
of the US dollar as a "safe haven" currency, especially in slowdowns, jointly with the broadly 
countercyclical behaviour of public spending. Accordingly, interest rate increases in the US 
due to higher public spending in troughs coupled with higher overall risk aversion, would lead 
to even more elevated foreign sovereign bond rates. 
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